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This commentary will critically evaluate
the US Government Policy for Oversight of
Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Con-
cern with a special focus on the process of
assessing the risks and benefits of studies
that are deemed to be dual use research
of concern (DURC). Assessing the risks
and benefits of DURC studies is probably
the most complicated part in implement-
ing the policy. Curiously, little attention has
been paid to this complex process. This
paper details how this process is conducted
and points out a major challenge it faces.
We will suggest that this challenge is dif-
ficult to resolve thereby requiring further
policy development.
On March 29, 2012, the US Government
issued The United States Government Pol-
icy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Research of Concern (1). The policy was
published after months of controversy over
the issue of whether studies that enhanced
the transmissibility of the highly patho-
genic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses
should be published and if so in what form
(2). The main concern these studies have
generated was that if they are to be pub-
lished in full malevolent actors might mis-
use the information included in them to
construct a deadly virus. Issuing the policy
was, at least in part, a way for the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that it is taking
control of the events and is pursuing steps
that would mitigate some of the concerns
that were raised about these studies.
Importantly, the policy gave the US
Government tools; it lacked when the
H5N1 controversy erupted. Examples of
such tools are listed below.
The new policy, for example, pro-
vides the government with the authority
to terminate funding of research that is
deemed too risky (1). This is an extreme
measure that is unlikely to be used; how-
ever, including it in the policy reveals
not only the sense of pressure govern-
ment officials felt given the circumstances,
but also their belief that the government
should have a very wide scope of tools that
could be employed to govern this research.
Other tools the policy provides are related
to determining the biosafety conditions
under which the research is done and a
periodic assessment of the research for its
potential to be DURC. This periodic assess-
ment is a direct result of the H5N1 contro-
versy, in which it seemed the US Govern-
ment was caught by surprise by the ensu-
ing crisis. The periodic review allows the
government to be constantly updated on
the state of the research portfolio it funds.
These steps are crucial given the potential
that more DURC studies are likely to be
conducted.
To decide which of these steps should
be applied the policy articulates a four-step
process (1). The first step is to determine
whether the research involves a pathogen
from a list of 15 infectious agents and tox-
ins that are deemed most lethal. The second
step is to determine whether that research
performs an experiment that falls under
any of the seven categories of experiments
listed in the policy.
If the study meets these two criteria, a
third step is pursued, specifically, determin-
ing whether the study meets the DURC def-
inition set out in the policy. The definition
is as follows:
“DURC is life sciences research that,
based on current understanding, can
be reasonably anticipated to provide
knowledge, information, products, or
technologies that could be directly
misapplied to pose a significant threat
with broad potential consequences
to public health and safety, agricul-
tural crops and other plants, animals,
the environment, materiel, or national
security.”
This definition was adopted with a few
revisions from an earlier definition that
the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity has articulated in its report
“Proposed Framework for the Oversight of
Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strate-
gies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse
of Research Information” (3):
“Research that, based on current
understanding, can be reasonably
anticipated to provide knowledge,
products, or technologies that could
be directly misapplied by others to
pose a threat to public health and
safety, agricultural crops and other
plants, animals, the environment, or
materiel.”
The definitions are similar but have two
differences worth pointing out.
The first difference is that the phrase
“by others” was eliminated from the new
DURC definition. This phrase was origi-
nally intended to express the idea that sci-
entists are well-intended when conducting
research, while “others,” malevolent actors,
might misapply their research. Eliminating
the phrase “by others” could be under-
stood as suggesting that scientists them-
selves could misapply research findings.
This is probably the result of the 2001
U.S. Anthrax attacks, which were allegedly
undertaken by a scientist and resulted in 5
deaths and 17 injuries (4). Another possible
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reason for this change is the acknowl-
edgment that scientists might accidentally
misapply their research.
The second difference is the addition of
the phrase “a significant threat with broad
potential consequences” to the new defi-
nition. This addition is intended to help
those that assess particular studies; it aims
to provide them with a more specific cri-
terion with which they can assess the risks
of misuse. However, this addition though
intended to help is still vague and is likely
to be interpreted in an inconsistent way
thereby endangering the effectiveness of
the policy. This vagueness, we propose,
should be addressed. One way in which
this could be achieved is by entirely elim-
inating the third step and moving directly
to the fourth step, which calls for a robust
risk benefit assessment. This assessment is
the only way in which the magnitude of
the risks and their likelihood will be deter-
mined; the third step is redundant and
confuses the process.
As said, the fourth step of the policy calls
for an assessment of the risks and benefits
of the studies that were determined to be
DURC. The risk benefit assessment is uti-
lized to decide whether any of the tools the
policy provides ought to be used: should
the study design be modified, should it be
done under different conditions, should its
publication be subject to any limitations,
should its funding be terminated?
However, the fourth step presents a seri-
ous challenge. A challenge that we would
argue ought to be seriously considered and
addressed if possible. To be clear, this chal-
lenge is related to the policy as it is currently
set out. The policy places the responsibility
for conducting the risk benefit assessment
in the hands of scientists; however, gener-
ally speaking scientists lack the knowledge
and capabilities required for assessing the
risks of misuse.
A risk benefit assessment for DURC is
unique in its focus on the risks of misuse
by malevolent actors (5). In other words,
a DURC assessment is essentially a biose-
curity assessment. Yet, the scientific com-
munity is not equipped with the knowl-
edge, expertise, and capabilities to conduct
a security assessment (6).
The scientific community is well placed
to assess the public health benefits of their
research. They can provide sound assess-
ments of the likelihood of the benefits and
their magnitude. We would also argue that
they are well placed to assess the magni-
tude of the harms if the research is misused.
They might even be able to provide a sound
assessment of the feasibility of misusing
the information. That is, they are able to
attest to the technical abilities needed and
whether they are easy or difficult to acquire.
Yet, scientists are incapable of assess-
ing the likelihood that a given study would
be misused; they do not have access to
such information. This kind of informa-
tion is not publically available. In particu-
lar, they have no way of knowing if there
is any group with the intention of misus-
ing the research information or materiel.
They also lack any information regarding
the capabilities of any group that might
have the intention to misuse research find-
ings. Moreover, they do not have access to
knowledge about efforts to prevent groups
who intend on doing harm and the suc-
cess of such efforts. Without this infor-
mation, the scientific community cannot
assess DURC.
The kind of information that is needed
for a comprehensive assessment would only
exist within the security and intelligence
community. This kind of information is
sensitive and thus it is unlikely that it will
be shared with the scientific community
unless a reliable mechanism to convey such
information is established.
However, one might only imagine the
difficulties of establishing such a mecha-
nism. Scientists would have to get secu-
rity clearances; they would also have to be
trained on how to interpret such informa-
tion reliably (6). This has been done to a
limited extent through the creation of the
Biological Sciences Experts Group (BSEG)
in which a limited number of scientists
and science administrators receive clear-
ance and are briefed from time to time (7).
Yet this model cannot meet the demands of
the new policy as it is too limited in scope
and authority. The security and intelligence
communities, it is safe to say, are unlikely
to agree to extend this type of mechanism.
They would object to sharing sensitive and
classified information with a growing num-
ber of people outside their institutions. The
risks of such a mechanism are too high.
One might suggest a middle way in
which security personnel would partici-
pate in the assessment process and pro-
vide input on whether a given study has
high or low likelihood to be misused. But
even this middle way would be problem-
atic as scientists would probably demand
greater transparency if they are to accept
any limitations on their freedom to pursue
scientific inquiries. Greater transparency,
however, is unlikely to be forthcoming as
providing more detailed information could
have detrimental effects to the intelligence
operations.
This divides between the interests of the
scientific community and the security and
intelligence communities must be bridged
if we are to address the DURC challenge
effectively. Leaving the policy as it cur-
rently stands seems unsustainable. This is
because it would lead to problematic out-
comes. Without information on the like-
lihood of misuse scientists would have to
turn to“educated guesses,”under such con-
ditions they are likely to make two kinds of
mistakes. First, they might place low likeli-
hood of misuse on studies that have a high
chance to be misused, thereby endanger-
ing national security. Second, they might
curtail important research on the grounds
that it encapsulates high risks of misuse
although in reality such research is unlikely
to be misused thereby harming important
advances that could benefit public health.
As suggested, to avoid these potential
mistakes a way for the security establish-
ment and the scientific community to col-
laborate must be sought. If such a mecha-
nism is impossible to set up, policy mak-
ers must convey to the public that the
DURC policy has limits. Moreover, scien-
tists conducting DURC reviews must be
aware that their determinations are subject
to the kinds of mistakes that we pointed
out. Should they then err on the side of
caution or not is a difficult question that
should receive close scrutiny (8, 9).
It is important to note that there are still
policy tools available to the government
if the dangers of misuse are increasing. It
is the responsibility of the security estab-
lishment to constantly be on the lookout
for malevolent actors who intend to mis-
use scientific information. If these risks are
increasing dramatically they could demand
that certain lines of research be done in
a classified way. The scientific community
in the US as well as in other countries is
unlikely to easily endorse this approach, yet
it did so already when it became clear that
openly conducted nuclear physics research
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poses severe risks to society (10). This is
not the situation we are facing with regard
to life sciences research. Yet, it is important
to realize that the limitations of the DURC
policy can be addressed in an alternative
way if warranted.
To conclude, the US Government policy
for the oversight of DURC is an impor-
tant step in attempting to balance the need
for scientific progress and safeguarding our
societies. Yet the policy is formulated in
such a way that the risks of misuse can-
not be accurately assessed. To fulfill its
goal further policy development efforts are
necessary.
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